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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper examines the effects of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on 
financial analysts’ information environment, specifically on analysts forecast accuracy in the Korean market. We 
find that financial analysts’ forecast accuracy improves after the mandatory IFRS adoption. We further investigate 
the source of observed accuracy enhancements and find that the improved forecast accuracy is attributable to the 
increased precision in analysts’ information sets for KOSPI firms and increased opportunity for earnings 
management for KOSDAQ firms. We also find that the analyst coverage in Korean market is reduced after 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around the world represents the 
most important regulatory change for financial reporting in recent years. In 2005, the European Union 
member countries, Australia, and New Zealand required all publicly listed firms to switch to IFRS for 
financial reporting purposes. This move increased the pressure for Korean firms to switch from domestic accounting 
standards to IFRS with enhanced transparency and comparability of accounting numbers for international investors. 
In response to this increased pressure, Korean government required publicly listed firms and financial institutions in 
Korea to adopt IFRS by the end of 2011. 
 
This study investigates how the recent mandatory adoption of IFRS affects financial analysts’ information 
environment, specifically the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts in Korean market. Financial ana lysts are 
among the most important and sophisticated users of financial reporting service, and therefore examining the effects 
of IFRS adoption on analysts would enhance our understanding of the consequences of IFRS adoption. Especially, 
IFRS adoption in Korea provides a great opportunity to examine the issue because IFRS adoption produce more 
significant differences in financial reporting practices in Korea than many other countries where IFRS adoption has 
taken places. Before IFRS adoption, the primary financial statements of Korean firms required to be disclosed are 
standalone (unconsolidated) financial statements. However, IFRS adoption designate consolidated financial 
statements as the primary financial statements, which exert a strong influence on Korean firms’ financial reporting.  
Although many previous studies examined the issue, it is still controversial how mandatory IFRS adoption would 
affect financial analysts. On the one hand, proponents of IFRS claim that IFRS adoption has improved analysts’ 
information environment, on the grounds that IFRS enhances the disclosure quality and transparency and/or 
increases the comparability of financial reporting (Bae, Tan, & Welker, 2008; Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008). On 
the other hand, opponents argue that IFRS adoption render financial reporting less informative, because “one size 
fits all” IFRS might be less reflective of domestic firms’ unique financial position and operating performance (Ball, 
2006) and thereby, IFRS adoption reduce the quality of analysts ’ information. 
 
T 
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In order to examine the effects of mandatory adoption of IFRS on financial analysts' information environment in 
Korea, we perform several empirical analyses. Firstly, we check whether the mandatory IFRS adoption is associated 
with the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts; absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersions. We find that 
mandatory IFRS adoption significantly reduce analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersions, which suggests that 
mandatory IFRS adoption improves analysts’ information environment. Secondly, we investigate if the increase of 
analysts' forecast accuracy is caused by increased opportunities for earnings management instead of the 
improvement in analysts’ information sets. Managers have more opportunities un der IFRS to manage their earnings 
towards analysts’ forecasts because IFRS allows higher level of discretion in financial reporting. The results show 
that the accuracy in analysts’ forecasts is enhanced partly by the increase earnings management after IFRS  adoption. 
However, this effects are mainly concentrated in KOSDAQ firms. Thirdly, we examine whether the improvement in 
analysts' forecast accuracy is attributable to the increased precision in analysts' information sets. We find that 
mandatory IFRS adoption improves the precision of analysts' information sets. This, however, does not hold for 
KOSDAQ firms. Lastly, we study if mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with analysts’ coverage. Unlike other 
countries employing consolidated financial statements as the primary financial statements even before IFRS 
adoption, the primary financial statements for Korean firms have been changed from unconsolidated ones to 
consolidated ones with IFRS adoption. As a result, financial analysts are required to spend more t ime and efforts to 
provide their earnings forecasts based on consolidated financial statements. The results show that the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS reduces analysts’ coverage, suggesting that IFRS adoption in Korea has real effects on financial 
analyst in Korean market. 
 
Our study contributes to the previous literature on financial reporting and disclosure by providing empirical 
evidence of the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on analysts’ information environment using Korean data. We 
exploit the unique situation for Korean firms surrounding IFRS adoption in our empirical design. Also, we 
investigate which attributes of IFRS generate the improvements in analysts’ information environment. This study 
has important implications for policy makers and other us ers of financial statements who wish to evaluate and 
understand the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption, especially in emerging markets such as Korea. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the previous literature and d evelop our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection procedure and the research design, and Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 provides the robustness test results. In section 6, we summarize and conclude the paper.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Background: IFRS Adoption 
 
Proponents of IFRS argue that publicly traded companies must apply a single set of high -quality accounting 
standards in order to promote better functioning of capital markets (Jarrett, 2007). According to them, mandatory 
IFRS adoption has the potential to facilitate cross -border comparability, increase reporting transparency, decrease 
information costs, reduce information asymmetry, and thereby increase the liquidity, competitiveness, and efficiency 
of markets (Ball, 2006; Choi & Meek, 2005). As alleged by opponents of IFRS, however, if the “one size fits all” 
IFRS are not optimal than existing domestic accounting standards in reflecting firm performances, IFRS adoption 
would cause financial reporting to be less informative (Ball, 2006). 
 
Prior studies have extensively examined the effects of IFRS adoption on financial analysts’ information 
environment. It is still unclear, however, how IFRS adoption would affect analysts’ information enviro nment. The 
adoption of IFRS in Korea presents propitious opportunity to study this unsolved question because Korea’s unique 
regulatory and institutional features are significantly different from such countries as EU, Australia, and New 
Zealand which have adopted IFRS. Korean firms have experienced huge changes because their primary financial 
statements have been altered from unconsolidated ones to consolidated ones by IFRS adoption. Therefore, we can 
exploit this Korean case to investigate the difficulties and complexity which IFRS adoption might cause to users of 
financial statements, even to sophisticated users such as financial analysts. 
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2.2 IFRS and Analysts' Information Environment 
 
Early studies investigate the effects of voluntary adoption of IFRS on financial analysts' information environment. 
Specifically, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) and Bae et al. (2008) show that analysts benefit from improved 
consistency in firms’ policy choices . Several studies find an overall improvements in the information environment 
of analysts (Hodgdon, Tondkar, Harless, & Adhikari, 2008; Kim & Shi, 2012). 
 
Meanwhile, recent studies examine the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the information environme nt of 
analysts. However, the results are inconclusive. Even though overall findings support the improvements in analysts' 
information environment after IFRS adoption, there are several studies documenting the deterioration of information 
environment following IFRS adoption. Byard, Li, and Yu (2011) find decreases in forecast errors and dispersion 
after mandatory adoption, but only for firms in countries with strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting 
standards which are significantly different from IFRS. Tan, Wang, and Welker (2011) find that forecast accuracy 
improves for foreign analysts after IFRS adoption but domestic analysts' forecast accuracy is not affected, and that 
the change in accuracy is not increasing in the number of accounting differences between domestic accounting 
standards and IFRS. They conclude that IFRS adoption overall produces comparability benefits that enhance the 
usability of accounting data. Cotter, Tarca, and Wee (2012) study the impacts of IFRS adoption on properties of 
analysts' forecast for Australian firms and find that analyst forecast accuracy improves but there is no change in 
dispersion in the adoption year. Glaum, Baetge, Grothe, and Oberdörster (2013) show that the quality of disclosure 
improves after IFRS adoption, but this finding explains only a small proportion of the overall improvements in 
forecast accuracy. As a result, it is unclear whether mandatory IFRS adoption improves the properties of analysts’ 
forecasts.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis 
 
Our first hypothesis is about the impacts of IFRS adoption on the forecasts quality i.e. accuracy of financial analysts 
in Korea. The mandatory IFRS adoption in Korea might enhance the comparability and transparency of financial 
statements and therefore, improve analysts’ forecast quality. This reasoning leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The mandatory adoption of IFRS is positively associated with the accuracy of analysts' earnings 
forecasts. 
 
Previous studies investigate whether IFRS adoption enhance analysts' information  environment by examining 
absolute forecast errors, forecast dispersion, and the number of analysts following a firm. However, it is not clear 
whether they are truly caused by the improvements in analysts’ information sets because there could be possible 
alternative causes. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) argue that a firm’s reporting incentive is the primary factor that 
determines the informativeness of accounting statements. Byard et al. (2011) highlight the important role of 
enforcement regimes and firm-level reporting incentives in determining the impacts of mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Therefore, the change after IFRS adoption might be generated by the change in firms’ reporting incentives instead of 
the changes in analysts’ information sets. 
 
According to opponents of IFRS, IFRS has increased managerial flexibility and discretion especially due to the lack 
of implementation guidance and poor enforcement (Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 2013; Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Leuz, 
2003). Also, earnings management might have a meaningful role in determining accounting quality surrounding 
mandatory IFRS adoption1. Ahmed et al. (2013) and Chen, Tang, Jiang, and Lin (2010) find evidence of an increase 
in income smoothing and a reduction in timeliness of loss recognition following mandatory IFRS adoption. Also, 
Ahmed et al. (2013) find a significant increase in aggressive reporting of some accruals and fail to find an evidence 
of the reduction in earnings management. These evidences suggest that there are increased opportunities for earnings 
management following mandatory IFRS adoption. Furthermore, several studies do cument that firms manage their 
                                                                 
1 Paananen (2008) and Paananen and Lin (2009) find that mandatory IFRS adoption decreases financial reporting quality, in creases earnings 
management, and reduces timeliness of loss recognition in Germany. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) find no  decline in  t he p ervasi v en ess o f  
earnings management in Austria and the United Kingdom and find increase in France. 
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earnings towards a certain target such as analysts’ forecasts (Bannister & Newman, 1996; Degeorge, Patel, & 
Zeckhauser, 1999; Matsumoto, 2002; Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003; Hutton, 2005). Therefore, the documented 
increase in analysts’ forecast accuracy could be a consequence of increased opportunities of earnings management to 
match their analysts’ forecasts. If the improvement of forecasts accuracy after IFRS adoption is brought by the 
increased opportunities in earnings management, then the improved accuracy would be associated with increased 
level of earnings management. This consideration produces our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The increase in analysts' forecasts accuracy after mandatory IFRS adoption is associated wit h the 
increased level of earnings management. 
 
In order to gain more detailed understanding of analysts’ information environment, we also examine if the improved 
accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts is attributable to the increased precision of analyst s' information sets. 
Analysts generally utilize financial statements data as the main inputs to their models for earnings forecasts. 
Therefore, we are interested in examining whether and how mandatory IFRS adoption affects analysts’ information 
sets for earnings forecasting. Byard and Shaw (2003) find that high-quality annual and quarterly reports increase the 
precision of both analysts' public information and private information 2. Kim and Shi (2012) report that the added 
disclosures following voluntary IFRS adoption contribute to the enhanced precision of analysts’ information set. 
Based on these findings, we conjecture that mandatory IFRS adoption sharpens the precision of analysts’ 
information and therefore improves the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Therefore, we set our third hypothesis 
as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The increase in analysts' forecasts accuracy after mandatory  IFRS adoption is associated with the 
increased precision of analysts' information sets. 
 
Previous literature reports that the level of disclosure of a firm is positively related to the analyst coverage for the 
firm (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999). This relation is confirmed with international 
evidence (Hope 2003a; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2003). However, the empirical evidence for analyst coverage in IFRS 
literature are somewhat mixed. Byard et al. (2011) find that mandatory adopters exhibit no statistically significant 
change in analyst following in the European Union. Unlike Byard et al. (2011), Tan et al. (2011) find that mandatory 
IFRS adoption attracts more foreign analysts. These findings suggest that benefits from IFRS adoption might not be 
uniform across countries.  
 
Unlike other countries which have adopted IFRS, Korea experienced significant changes  in accounting practices 
especially in primary financial statements. In post-IFRS period, we can expect that financial analysts are required to 
spend more time and efforts in providing accurate forecasts, because they have to use consolidated financial 
statements. Therefore, we conjecture that mandatory IFRS adoption reduces the number of analysts following. This 
expectation leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: IFRS mandatory adoption is associated with decreased coverage by analysts. 
 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
We tests our hypotheses using a sample of Korean listed firms over the period from 2000 to 2013. We obtain annual 
financial data from KisValue III and one-year ahead earnings per share forecasts from Fn-guide3. Following 
Clement (1999), we make sure that no earnings forecasts are issued earlier than one year before the given fiscal 
                                                                 
2 Byard et al. (2011) investigate the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on analysts' information quality based on Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens 
(1998)’s model. They document improvements relative to the control sample in analysts' public and private information precision for mandatory 
adopters in countries with strong enforcement regimes and large divergence from IFRS.  
3 KisValue III and Fn-guide are Korean databases that provide financial data and analyst coverage. They are sim ilar  to  COMPUST AT an d 
I/B/E/S database, respectively. 
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year-end. We also exclude forecasts that are released after actual earnings announcement dates or 3 months after the 
given fiscal year-end. 
 
We restrict our sample to non-financial and non-utility firms because financial and utility firms operate in highly 
regulated industries with different accounting rules from those in other industries. We exclude firms that adopted 
IFRS before 2011 because they reported financial statements for the 2010 fiscal year in accordance with IFRS. 
Further, each firm-year observation is required to have a fiscal year ending in December in order to ensure 
homogeneity across sample firms. We exclude firms without financial or stock return data available. This procedure 
results in our final sample of 3,715 firm-year observations. We control for the influence of observations with 
extreme value by winsorizing dependent and independent variables at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
3.2 Measuring Analysts' Information Environment 
 
We measure the characteristics of analysts’ information environment using Absolute forecast errors, Forecast 
dispersion, and Analyst coverage (FLLW) (Byard et al., 2011; Kim & Shi, 2012). 
 
Absolute forecast errors (AFE) = 
|𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠−𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 |
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 (1) 
 
where 
 
Actual Earnings: actual annual EPS of firm i in year t 
 
Mean forecast: the mean of EPS forecasts made by analysts during the 12-month period before the fiscal 
year-end for firm i and year t, 
 
Stock price: the stock price of firm i at the beginning of year t4. 
 
Forecast dispersion (DISP) = 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑜𝑓  𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 (2) 
 
FLLW = ln(𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚) (3) 
 
3.3 Measuring Information Precision 
 
We follow Barron et al. (1998) to empirically measure the precision of information that analyst incorporate into their 
earnings forecasts. Our main test uses the precision of total (public and private) information, K, as the dependent 
variable. We also examine the impacts of mandatory IFRS adoption on the precision of public information that is 
common to all analysts (PUBLIC), the precision of private information that is idiosyncratic to an individual analyst 
(PRIVATE), and analysts' consensus which is the average proportion of analysts' public to total information 
(CONSENSUS). 
 
PUBLIC (Common) = 
𝑆𝐸 −𝐷/𝑁
[(1−1/𝑁)𝐷+𝑆𝐸]2
 (4) 
 
PRIVATE (Idiosyncratic) = 
𝐷
[(1−1/𝑁)𝐷+𝑆𝐸]2
 (5) 
 
CONSENSUS = 
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶
(𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶+𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸)
 (6) 
 
K (Total informat ion) = PUBLIC + PRIVATE (7) 
 
                                                                 
4 The results in the analysis using the median forecast are qualitatively similar. 
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where 
 
SE = the expected squared error in the mean forecast 
 
D = the expected forecast dispersion 
 
N = the number of forecasts for firm i in year t 
 
We limit our data to the most recent one-year-ahead forecasts of annual earnings. We use the within-year fractional 
rank of K (denoted as RK) to reduce the influence of outliers and skewness. Specifically, we transform PUBLIC, 
PRIVATE and CONSENSUS into [0, 1] decile ranks5. 
 
3.4 Research Design 
 
To test Hypothesis 1 and investigate differences in the properties of analysts' forecasts surrounding IFRS mandatory 
compliance we construct a regression equation. Our approach follows prior studies that employ the  characteristics of 
analysts’ forecasts as proxies for the information environment (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Healy et al., 1999; Lang et 
al., 2003). We use two measures to capture analysts' information environment for a firm: absolute forecast errors, 
forecast dispersion. This yields the following regression equation: 
 
AFEit (or DISPit) = β0 +β1IFRSit + β2ABACCit + β3SIZEit + β4LEVit + β5LOSSit 
+ β6ROAit + β7HORIZONit + β8FLLWit + ΣIND + Ɛit (8) 
 
AFE and DISP are the absolute forecast errors and the forecast dispersion for firm i and year t, respectively. IFRS is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if firm i adopted IFRS in year t. We only include mandatory 
adopters in our sample because firms that have already voluntarily switched to IFRS prior to the mandate may not 
exhibit significant effects when IFRS reporting becomes mandatory (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008). The key 
coefficient of interest, β1, captures the difference in analysts' information environment between the test and control 
firms, and therefore, the impacts of mandatory IFRS adoption on analysts’ forecasts accuracy. If IFRS adoption 
improves the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts, then β1 would have significantly negative value. 
 
Previous research (Clement, 1999; Duru & Reeb, 2002) suggests various factors that might affect forecast errors and 
dispersion. Control variables include the level of absolute accruals (ABACC), the natural logarithm of total asset 
(SIZE), debt ratio (LEV), reporting negative income (LOSS), current year's return on assets (ROA), forecast horizon 
(HORIZON), and analyst coverage (FLLW). Specifically, ABACC is calculated as absolute value of income before 
extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations deflated by total assets. LEV is the ratio of short and long term 
debt to total assets. LOSS is a dummy variable set to one if the firm has negative earnings for the fiscal year and zero 
otherwise. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. HORIZON is the natural logarithm of 
the number of days between the forecast issuing date and the fiscal year-end. We measure analyst coverage (FLLW) 
as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts making EPS forecasts of a firm. We also include industry fixed 
effects (IND) and use adjusted standard errors for firm-level clustering to mitigate serial correlation within a firm 
(Ahmed et al., 2013). 
 
Second equation is to test Hypothesis 2 and examine whether earnings management can explain the changes in 
forecast accuracy. Specifically, we investigate whether forecast accuracy improves more for IFRS adopter firms that 
have large absolute discretionary accruals. Prior studies find that firms followed by analysts who issue earnings 
forecasts exhibit lower earnings management (DeFond & Hung, 2003; McInnis & Collins, 2011). Control variables 
used in (8) are also included: 
 
AFEit = β0 +β1IFRSit + β2ABSDAit + β3IFRSit×ABSDAit + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit 
+ β6LOSSit + β7ROAit + β8HORIZONit + β9FLLWit + ΣIND + Ɛit (9) 
                                                                 
5 We rank each raw variable into 0-9 and then divide the decile ranks by 9 (Botosan, Plumlee, & Xie, 2004; Byard et al., 2011). 
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We estimate absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA) using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 
1995). If the increase of forecast accuracy is caused by earnings management, then β3 would be significantly 
negative. 
 
We test Hypothesis 3 and study the relation between the precision of analysts' information sets (RK) and IFRS 
adoption to check whether mandatory IFRS adoption increases the precision of the analysts’ information sets. 
Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation: 
 
RKit = β0 + β1IFRSit + β2ABACCit + β3SIZEit + β4LEVit + β5LOSSit + β6ROAit 
+ β7HORIZONit + β8FLLWit + ΣIND + Ɛit (10) 
 
In Equation (10), we include several control variables used in previous studies (Byard & Shaw, 2003; Chung, Kim, 
& Kim, 2004; Kim & Yi, 2011). All variables are as defined above. 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 4, we estimate a regression equation which links IFRS adoption to analyst coverage. We 
incorporate various determinants of analyst coverage identified in previous literature in our multivariate regression 
equation as control variables (Bhushan, 1989; Hope, 2003a, 2003b; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lang et al., 2003). 
This yields the following regression equation: 
 
FLLWit = β0 + β1IFRSit + β2ABACCit + β3SIZEit + β4LEVit + β5LOSSit 
+ β6ROAit + β7HORIZONit + β8DISPit + ΣIND + Ɛit (11) 
 
All variables are as defined above. If IFRS adoption is associated with decreased coverage by analysts, then our 
fourth hypothesis predicts a significantly negative value for β1. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for various subsamples and univariate tests for the difference in mean and 
median between the IFRS adoption sample (IFRS=1) and non-adoption sample (IFRS=0). The mean (median) 
absolute forecast errors (AFE), forecast dispersion (DISP) are 0.073 (0.018) and 0.006 (0.000) respectively for the 
full sample. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Difference 
Panel A: Full Sample (A) and IFRS=1 (B) 
 Full Sample (A) IFRS=1 (B) 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables 
AFE 0.073  0.018  0.526  0.041  0.018  0.113  
DISP 0.006  0.000  0.020  0.004  0.000  0.014  
FLLW 0.899  0.693  1.013  0.585  0.000  0.907  
RK 0.498  0.444  0.319  0.511  0.556  0.318  
Control Variables 
ABSDA 0.084  0.055  0.091  0.066  0.043  0.071  
ABACC 0.093  0.060  0.102  0.071  0.047  0.079  
SIZE 25.159  25.051  1.704  25.757  25.506  1.399  
LEV 0.440  0.435  0.337  0.407  0.405  0.203  
LOSS 0.209  0.000  0.407  0.242  0.000  0.428  
ROA 0.054  0.053  0.127  0.041  0.038  0.083  
HORIZON 5.041  5.167  0.582  4.967  5.128  0.616  
(Table 1, Panel B continued on next page) 
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(Table 1 continued) 
Panel B: IFRS=0 (C) and Test for Difference (B-C) 
 IFRS=0 (C) Test for Difference (B-C) 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Mean 
(t-value) 
Median 
(z-value) 
Dependent Variables 
AFE 0.093  0.017  0.667  -3.03***  0.59 
DISP 0.008  0.001  0.023  -6.17***  -9.38***  
FLLW 1.005  0.693  1.015  -15.06***  -15.19***  
RK 0.500  0.556  0.319  0.95 -0.82 
Control Variables 
ABSDA 0.090  0.060  0.096  -15.66***  -14.23***  
ABACC 0.099  0.064  0.107  -16.42***  -14.97***  
SIZE 24.969  24.876  1.729  28.86***  28.95***  
LEV 0.450  0.442  0.367  -7.75***  -7.74***  
LOSS 0.200  0.000  0.400  6.31***  0.88 
ROA 0.058  0.058  0.137  -7.94***  -16.84***  
HORIZON 5.061  5.176  0.571  -5.99***  -5.34***  
AFE is absolute forecast errors and calculated as |Actual Earnings-Mean forecast| / Stock price, where Actual Earnings is actual annual EP S fo r  
firm i in year t, Mean forecast is the mean of forecasts made by analysts during the 12-month period before the fiscal year-end for firm i and year 
t, and Stock price is the stock price of firm i at  the beginning of year t. DISP is forecast dispersion for firm i in year t and calculated as Sta nd ard  
deviation of forecasts/Stock price. FLLW is analyst coverage and calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts m aking an  EPS 
forecast of a firm. K is measured as the sum of the precision of public information (PUBLIC) and private information (PRIVATE) and then we use 
the within-year fractional rank of K to calculate RK. IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if firm i’s financial sta tements ar e  
prepared under IFRS in year t, zero otherwise. ABSDA is measured using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). ABACC is calculat ed 
as absolute value of income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations deflated by total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm o f 
total assets. LEV is the ratio of short and long term debt to total assets. LOSS is a dummy variable set to one if the firm has negative earnings fo r  
the fiscal year, zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. HORIZON is the natural lo garith m o f t he 
number of days between the forecast issuing date and the fiscal year-end. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Non-adoption sample is larger than IFRS adoption sample in the level of absolute forecast errors (AFE) and forecast 
dispersion (DISP). This suggests that mandatory IFRS adoption leads to decreased absolute forecast errors and 
forecast dispersion. The mean (median) natural logarithm of the number of analyst (FLLW), is 0.899 (0.693) for the 
full sample, while it is 0.585 and 1.005 (0.000 and 0.693) for the IFRS adoption (IFRS=1) and non-adoption sample 
(IFRS=0), respectively. Both t- and z-tests show that FLLW is significantly lower for IFRS adoption period than for 
non-adoption period, implying that mandatory IFRS adoption affects financial analysts’ behaviors and makes them 
to cover less firms with IFRS adoption. On the other hand, the precision of analyst information sets (RK) exhibits no 
significant difference between the two subsamples, which indicates that the information precision in IFRS adoption 
period is not meaningfully different from that in non-adoption period. The level of absolute discretionary accruals 
(ABSDA) and absolute accruals (ABACC) are different across the two subsamples. We find that absolute 
discretionary accruals and absolute accruals are reduced significantly from years before IFRS adoption to years after 
IFRS adoption. The univariate analyses provides primitive evidence for our research questions, partially s uggesting 
that mandatory IFRS adoption might improve analysts' information environment. 
 
We also find that size (SIZE) and frequency of net loss (LOSS) increase, but debt ratio (LEV), profitability (ROA), 
and the forecast horizon (HORIZON) decrease substantially after IFRS adoption. 
 
Table 2 presents Pearson correlations among main variables. IFRS is negatively correlated with AFE, DISP, and 
FLLW, indicating that mandatory IFRS adoption might reduce earnings forecast errors, forecast dispersion and 
analyst coverage. Both ABSDA and ABACC are negatively correlated with IFRS, suggesting that IFRS adoption 
results in reduced accruals. However, IFRS is not significantly correlated with RK, suggesting no evidence that 
mandatory IFRS adoption results in more precis e information available to analysts. Also, IFRS is positively 
correlated with SIZE and LOSS and negatively correlated with LEV, ROA and HORIZON. 
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. AFE 1 
          
2. DISP 0.07*** 1 
         
3. FLLW -0.05*** 0.22*** 1 
        
4. RK -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.34*** 1 
       
5. IFRS -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.18*** 0.020 1 
      
6. ABSDA 0.13*** 0.09*** -0.05*** 0.010 -0.11*** 1 
     
7. ABACC 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.000 -0.020 -0.11*** 0.87*** 1 
    
8. SIZE 0.000 0.15*** 0.60*** -0.53*** 0.19*** -0.21*** -0.22*** 1 
   
9. LEV 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.12*** -0.18*** -0.05*** 0.13*** 0.16*** -0.02*** 1 
  
10. LOSS 0.12*** 0.07*** -0.06*** -0.17*** 0.04*** 0.13*** 0.18*** -0.06*** 0.15*** 1 
 
11. ROA -0.07*** -0.04*** 0.12*** 0.12*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 0.03*** -0.19*** -0.49*** 1 
12. HORIZON 0.010 0.020 0.17*** -0.28*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.12*** 0.05*** 0.07*** -0.11*** 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 shows the estimated results of regression equation (8). We also present the estimated coefficients for 
different subsamples. Columns (1) and (2) show the result for the whole sample period. Columns (3) and (4) show 
the estimates when year 2009 and 2010 are excluded. During these two years, some Korean firms had voluntarily 
adopted IFRS. Columns (5) and (6) show the estimation result over the period from 2007 to 2013. This period is 
regarded to be homogeneous in terms of economic conditions and therefore more comparable 6. 
 
As shown in Table 3, the mandatory IFRS adoption in Korea reduces the absolute forecast error and forecast 
dispersion substantially. The negative coefficients on IFRS are statistically significant at 1 percent level in models 
(1), (2), (3), and (5) and at 5 percent level in model (4). These results imply that forecast accuracy improves 
significantly after mandatory IFRS adoption. This finding is valid in full sample period as well as in various sub-
periods7, and supports our first hypothesis. 
 
  
                                                                 
6 We also try alternative periods such as from 2008 or 2009 to 2013 and find qualitatively similar results.  
7 In unreported tests, we find that the results are qualitatively similar for KOSPI and KOSDAQ subsamples. 
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Table 3. OLS regression of analysts’ forecast accuracy on mandatory IFRS Adoption 
Panel A: 2000-2013 and Excluding 2009-2010 
Sample Period: 2000-2013 Excluding 2009-2010 
Dependent Variables: AFE(1) DISP(2) AFE(3) DISP(4) 
IFRS (indicator) 
-0.041*** -0.002*** -0.031*** -0.001** 
(-3.339) (-3.547) (-3.005) (-1.973) 
ABACC 
0.755 0.025 0.340** 0.018* 
(1.511) (1.489) (2.258) (1.670) 
SIZE 
0.001 -0.000 -0.016 0.000 
(0.056) (-0.712) (-1.034) (0.084) 
LEV 
0.256** 0.008*** 0.200* 0.006** 
(2.422) (3.803) (1.746) (2.433) 
LOSS 
0.145*** 0.003 0.091** 0.002 
(2.851) (1.578) (2.270) (1.280) 
ROA 
0.169 -0.008 -0.016 -0.006 
(1.145) (-1.579) (-0.196) (-1.260) 
HORIZON 
0.021 -0.001 0.009 0.001* 
(1.223) (-1.114) (0.508) (1.668) 
FLLW 
-0.038** 0.004*** -0.019** 0.003*** 
(-2.023) (7.448) (-2.039) (5.529) 
Intercept 
-0.183 0.017 0.405 -0.001 
(-0.396) (1.308) (1.411) (-0.070) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 3,715 3,601 2,715 2,601 
Adjusted R-square 0.047 0.076 0.047 0.076 
 
Panel B: 2007-2013 
Sample Period: 2007-2013 
Dependent Variables: AFE(5) DISP(6) 
IFRS (indicator) 
-0.033*** -0.002*** 
(-2.736) (-4.009) 
ABACC 
0.727 0.030 
(1.253) (1.583) 
SIZE 
0.012 -0.000 
(0.889) (-0.605) 
LEV 
0.135** 0.010*** 
(2.006) (3.981) 
LOSS 
0.088 0.003 
(1.473) (1.377) 
ROA 
0.068 -0.006 
(0.502) (-1.153) 
HORIZON 
0.007 -0.001 
(0.542) (-1.347) 
FLLW 
-0.031 0.004*** 
(-1.523) (7.362) 
Intercept 
-0.375 0.017 
(-0.806) (1.247) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
No. of observations 3,139 3,141 
Adjusted R-square 0.052 0.084 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. Robust t -statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 provides the estimation results for equation (9). Here, we test whether the improvements in analysts' forecast 
accuracy after IFRS adoption are attributable to increased opportunities for earnings management. In full sample, the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term IFRS×ABSDA is negative but not statistically significant. Only in the 
sub-period without year 2009 and 2010 the coefficient is negative and significant at the 10 percent level (model (2)). 
In the subsample of KOSPI firms, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative but not significant. 
 
However, the coefficient on the interaction term IFRS×ABSDA is negative and significant in the subsample of 
KOSDAQ firms. This is consistent with the earnings management explanation as it indicates that the reduction in 
the forecast errors after IFRS adoption is more pronounced for firms which have large discretionary accruals, in 
other words, more opportunities to manage earnings. This empirical evidence suggests that the improved analyst 
forecast accuracy after IFRS adoption is mainly driven by earnings manipulation in KOSDAQ firms but not in 
KOSPI firms. This result is partially consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 4. OLS regression of analysts’ forecast accuracy on earnings management 
Panel A: Full sample firms and KOSPI firms 
 
Full sample firms KOSPI firms 
Dependent Variables: AFE AFE 
Sample Period: 2000-2013 
Excluding 
2009-2010 
2007-2013 2000-2013 
Excluding 
2009-2010 
2007-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IFRS (indicator) 
0.029 -0.005 0.038 0.094 0.020 0.085 
(0.610) (-0.241) (0.657) (0.927) (0.403) (0.622) 
ABSDA 
1.111 0.398** 1.188 2.788 1.035* 2.962 
(1.389) (1.989) (1.223) (1.401) (1.717) (1.161) 
IFRS×ABSDA 
-1.184 -0.460* -1.145 -2.955 -1.077 -2.189 
(-1.384) (-1.665) (-1.094) (-1.346) (-1.450) (-0.707) 
SIZE 
0.001 -0.017 0.013 -0.002 -0.044 0.019 
(0.086) (-1.068) (0.915) (-0.062) (-1.226) (0.833) 
LEV 
0.274** 0.225* 0.141* 0.445** 0.322 0.222 
(2.371) (1.766) (1.956) (2.101) (1.506) (1.531) 
LOSS 
0.155*** 0.094** 0.096 0.295*** 0.180** 0.004 
(2.732) (2.185) (1.420) (2.618) (2.137) (0.020) 
ROA 
0.216 0.019 0.108 0.289 -0.268 0.766 
(1.412) (0.253) (0.695) (0.613) (-0.808) (1.598) 
HORIZON 
0.024 0.010 0.009 0.053 0.025 0.026 
(1.294) (0.551) (0.644) (1.460) (0.718) (0.644) 
FOLLOW 
-0.038** -0.018* -0.032 -0.050 -0.007 -0.038 
(-1.977) (-1.861) (-1.453) (-1.529) (-0.335) (-0.982) 
Intercept 
-0.255 0.419 -0.469 -0.456 1.022 -0.808 
(-0.490) (1.403) (-0.866) (-0.457) (1.405) (-0.793) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 3,637 2,657 3,069 1,862 1,373 1,548 
Adjusted R-square 0.052 0.046 0.061 0.094 0.066 0.233 
(Table 4, Panel B continued on next page) 
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(Table 4 continued) 
Panel B: KOSDAQ firms 
 KOSDAQ firms 
Dependent Variables: AFE 
Sample Period: 2000-2013 Excluding 2009-2010 2007-2013 
 (7) (8) (9) 
IFRS (indicator) 
-0.005 0.004 -0.003 
(-0.670) (0.343) (-0.537) 
ABSDA 
0.128* 0.209** 0.131** 
(1.823) (2.283) (2.493) 
IFRS×ABSDA 
-0.159** -0.226** -0.148*** 
(-2.344) (-2.555) (-2.651) 
SIZE 
-0.021 -0.011** -0.023 
(-1.344) (-2.128) (-1.197) 
LEV 
0.116*** 0.091*** 0.100** 
(2.776) (3.546) (2.087) 
LOSS 
0.050*** 0.031*** 0.047*** 
(4.420) (3.110) (3.912) 
ROA 
0.099 0.031 0.048 
(1.335) (0.414) (1.067) 
HORIZON 
-0.001 -0.004 0.001 
(-0.091) (-0.595) (0.156) 
FOLLOW 
-0.015*** -0.016*** -0.008* 
(-2.985) (-3.450) (-1.696) 
Intercept 
0.531 0.305** 0.580 
(1.412) (2.364) (1.262) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1,775 1,284 1,521 
Adjusted R-square 0.051 0.412 0.010 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. Robust t -statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5 presents the analyses results for regression equation (10) where we examine the impacts of the mandatory 
IFRS adoption on information precision. The coefficient estimate of IFRS are significantly positive in full sample 
and KOSPI subsample (model (1) through (6)). This shows that mandatory IFRS adoption enhances corporate 
disclosure and improves the precision of analysts' information sets. This finding is consistent with the argument that 
analysts are encouraged to incorporate more precise information caused by IFRS adoption into their earnings 
forecasts. However, for KOSDAQ firms, the coefficient of IFRS is negative and statistically not significant across 
all sample period (model (7) through (9)). These results largely support the view that the imp rovements in analysts’ 
forecast accuracy is brought by improved precision of analysts' information sets after IFRS adoption. 
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Table 5. OLS regression of information precision on mandatory IFRS adoption 
Panel A: Full sample firms and KOSPI firms 
 (1) Full sample firms (2) KOSPI firms 
Dependent Variables: RK RK 
Sample Period: 2000-2013 Excluding 
2009-2010 
2007-2013 2000-2013 Excluding 
2009-2010 
2007-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IFRS (indicator) 
0.026*** 0.031*** 0.017* 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 
(2.713) (2.747) (1.717) (3.717) (3.051) (3.276) 
ABACC 
-0.331*** -0.322*** -0.352*** -0.198* -0.208 -0.202* 
(-5.388) (-4.293) (-5.348) (-1.915) (-1.618) (-1.819) 
SIZE 
-0.090*** -0.088*** -0.093*** -0.097*** -0.094*** -0.102*** 
(-21.690) (-18.328) (-20.887) (-16.684) (-13.677) (-16.245) 
LEV 
0.097*** 0.094*** 0.113*** 0.123*** 0.097** 0.168*** 
(3.601) (2.948) (3.914) (3.210) (2.123) (4.052) 
LOSS 
-0.169*** -0.177*** -0.163*** -0.162*** -0.164*** -0.150*** 
(-10.691) (-9.632) (-9.582) (-7.237) (-6.309) (-6.107) 
ROA 
-0.173** -0.187** -0.204*** -0.195* -0.219 -0.189 
(-2.451) (-2.264) (-2.651) (-1.748) (-1.632) (-1.560) 
HORIZON 
-0.145*** -0.149*** -0.137*** -0.134*** -0.157*** -0.125*** 
(-12.878) (-10.802) (-11.328) (-7.539) (-7.116) (-6.634) 
FLLW 
-0.005 -0.001 -0.008 0.010 0.011 0.007 
(-0.876) (-0.200) (-1.265) (1.349) (1.228) (0.967) 
Intercept 
3.576*** 3.554*** 3.638*** 3.638*** 3.685*** 3.714*** 
(31.673) (27.268) (29.942) (21.487) (18.229) (20.620) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 3,511 2,558 2,952 1,820 1,331 1,518 
Adjusted R-square 0.375 0.362 0.392 0.357 0.335 0.380 
 
Panel B: KOSDAQ firms 
 (3) KOSDAQ firms 
Dependent Variables: RK 
Sample Period: 2000-2013 Excluding 2009-2010 2007-2013 
 (7) (8) (9) 
IFRS (indicator) 
-0.011 -0.001 -0.021 
(-0.841) (-0.091) (-1.545) 
ABACC 
-0.435*** -0.410*** -0.468*** 
(-5.901) (-4.604) (-5.937) 
SIZE 
-0.056*** -0.059*** -0.060*** 
(-6.500) (-5.848) (-6.438) 
LEV 
0.054 0.059 0.053 
(1.438) (1.320) (1.309) 
LOSS 
-0.180*** -0.193*** -0.179*** 
(-8.340) (-7.618) (-7.873) 
ROA 
-0.150 -0.181* -0.195* 
(-1.639) (-1.700) (-1.943) 
HORIZON 
-0.155*** -0.146*** -0.149*** 
(-11.017) (-8.474) (-9.853) 
FLLW 
-0.036*** -0.029*** -0.037*** 
(-3.869) (-2.644) (-3.692) 
Intercept 
2.951*** 2.986*** 3.038*** 
(13.771) (12.058) (13.137) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1,691 1,227 1,434 
Adjusted R-square 0.213 0.209 0.221 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. Robust t -statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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We investigate the effects of IFRS adoption on the number of analysts following a firm using Equation (11). The 
results are reported in Table 6. The all of the estimated coefficients on IFRS are negative and significant at 1 percent 
level. The number of analysts following a firm significantly decreases after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in all 
subsamples and sample periods. These results indicate that the chang e of primary financial statement from 
unconsolidated ones to consolidated ones caused by IFRS adoption makes financial analysts to spend more time and  
efforts in providing earnings forecasts and, as consequence, the level of analyst coverage is substantially reduced. 
 
Table 6. OLS regression of analyst coverage on mandatory IFRS Adoption 
Panel A: Full Sample firms and KOSPI firms  
 
(1) Full sample firms (2) KOSPI firms 
Dependent Variable: FLLW FLLW 
Sample Period: 2000-2013 
Excluding 
2009-2010 
2007-2013 2000-2013 
Excluding 
2009-2010 
2007-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IFRS (indicator) 
-0.427*** -0.494*** -0.397*** -0.525*** -0.578*** -0.505*** 
(-13.170) (-13.658) (-12.164) (-10.906) (-11.036) (-10.394) 
ABACC 
-0.317 -0.344 -0.358* -0.708* -0.566 -0.979*** 
(-1.531) (-1.448) (-1.673) (-1.864) (-1.301) (-2.579) 
SIZE 
0.468*** 0.454*** 0.466*** 0.531*** 0.522*** 0.530*** 
(39.034) (36.890) (38.092) (30.578) (29.667) (29.414) 
LEV 
-0.368*** -0.461*** -0.393*** -0.127 -0.227 -0.118 
(-3.570) (-4.285) (-3.696) (-0.736) (-1.330) (-0.648) 
LOSS 
0.057 0.056 0.084* -0.021 -0.022 0.027 
(1.194) (1.073) (1.712) (-0.272) (-0.266) (0.325) 
ROA 
2.149*** 1.790*** 2.122*** 2.319*** 2.000*** 2.205*** 
(7.840) (6.287) (7.505) (4.877) (4.080) (4.484) 
HORIZON 
0.039* 0.001 0.031 0.070* 0.037 0.062 
(1.830) (0.044) (1.407) (1.833) (0.725) (1.499) 
DISP 
5.207*** 5.824*** 5.293*** 3.990*** 4.157** 3.858** 
(3.516) (2.991) (3.025) (2.999) (2.352) (2.472) 
Intercept 
-11.876*** -11.228*** -11.783*** -13.868*** -13.406*** -13.802*** 
(-38.477) (-35.289) (-37.450) (-31.478) (-28.422) (-30.302) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 3,601 2,601 3,141 1,894 1,385 1,613 
Adjusted R-square 0.507 0.488 0.501 0.520 0.499 0.506 
(Table 6, Panel B continued on next page) 
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(Table 6 continued) 
Panel B: KISDAQ firms 
 (3) KOSDAQ firms 
Dependent Variable: FLLW 
Sample Period: 2000-2013 Excluding 2009-2010 2007-2013 
 (7) (8) (9) 
IFRS (indicator) 
-0.330*** -0.389*** -0.286*** 
(-7.090) (-6.982) (-6.293) 
ABACC 
-0.184 -0.449 -0.063 
(-0.762) (-1.507) (-0.250) 
SIZE 
0.410*** 0.367*** 0.405*** 
(10.978) (9.272) (10.669) 
LEV 
-0.571*** -0.612*** -0.622*** 
(-5.077) (-4.748) (-5.494) 
LOSS 
0.058 0.062 0.061 
(1.110) (1.045) (1.160) 
ROA 
1.896*** 1.543*** 1.889*** 
(5.700) (4.618) (5.401) 
HORIZON 
0.030 0.002 0.021 
(1.372) (0.088) (0.928) 
DISP 
10.527*** 17.569*** 10.705*** 
(3.140) (3.469) (3.156) 
Intercept 
-10.054*** -8.735*** -9.945*** 
(-10.826) (-9.073) (-10.536) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1,707 1,216 1,528 
Adjusted R-square 0.336 0.327 0.338 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. Robust t -statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
5.1 An Alternative Measure for Earnings Management: Total Accrual 
 
In testing Hypothesis 2, we use absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA) for the earnings management measure. We 
check the robustness of our results by employing an alternative measure. Specifically, we replace absolute 
discretionary accruals (ABSDA) with absolute accruals (ABACC) in Equation (9) and estimate the regression 
equation. Absolute Accruals (ABACC) is the absolute difference between net income and cash flow, deflated by total 
asset. In this unreported test, the results are similar to those reported in Table 4. 
 
5.2. Analyses of Analysts' Public and Private Information 
 
Our main interest is the impacts of mandatory IFRS adoption on the precision of total information (public and 
private). In this subsection, we examine whether the improvements in the precision of total information is 
attributable to the improvements in public information or private information. 
 
Conventional wisdom states that enhanced disclosures and transparency after IFRS adoption would improve 
analysts' public information. However, the theoretical relation between mandatory IFRS adoption and the precision 
of private information is ambiguous. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) document that increased level of firm disclosures 
discourages analysts' incentives to produce private information. If this is the case, mandatory IFRS adoption is 
unlikely to improve the precision of private information. In contrast, Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997) report tha t 
increased disclosure level could complement analysts' private knowledge, allowing analysts to develop more private 
information. Lundholm (1991) finds that increased public information facilitates the allocation of private 
information. In this case, mandatory IFRS adoption might lead to more precise private information. 
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Byard and Shaw (2003) and Byard et al. (2011) show that enhanced disclosure increases the precision of both public 
and private information sets, implying that analysts' public information complements their private information. In 
order to empirically investigate this issue, we use Barron et al. (1998) measures as defined in equations (4), (5) and 
(6) to capture the precision of analysts' public and private information. 
 
In examining the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on analysts' public information, private information, and 
analysts' consensus, we employ the decile ranks of PUBLIC, PRIVATE and CONSENSUS to reduce the skewness 
problem. We also include all the control variables used in equation (10). 
 
In untabulated results, the coefficient of IFRS is positive and statistically significant in the regression with PRIVATE 
as dependent variable, which implies that mandatory IFRS adoption encourages analysts to incorporate private 
information into their earnings forecasts. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant in the regression 
where PUBLIC is the dependent variable. This evidence suggests that IFRS adoption is not likely to improve the 
quality of public information. 
 
As a result, it appears that improvements in the precision of total information, as reported in Table 5, is attributable 
to the improved precision of private information not public information. The enhancements in analysts' private 
information is consistent with previous findings that increased level of firm disclosures improves analysts' private 
information (Frankel, Kothari, & Weber, 2006; Barron et al., 1998). Also, the coefficient on IFRS is negatively 
significant in the regression with CONSENSUS as dependent variable. This indicates that IFRS adoption is more 
likely to increase the precision of analysts' private information than that of analysts' public information. 
 
In short, the results show that mandatory IFRS adoption improves the analysts’ information env ironment through the 
increased precision of private information rather than public information. This finding suggests that the positive 
association between the precision of total information and IFRS adoption is caused by the complementary relation 
between public and private information. 
  
6. CONCLUS ION 
 
This study investigates the effects of the 2011 mandatory adoption of IFRS by Korean firms on financial analysts' 
information environment. First, we find that mandatory IFRS adoption is followed by statistically significant 
decreases in analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion, supporting the claim that mandatory IFRS adoption 
improves analysts’ information environment. Second, we further test if the increases in analysts’ forecast accuracy is 
the consequence of more opportunities to manage earnings towards analysts’ forecasts after IFRS adoption. We find 
empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture, but in KOSDAQ firms only. Third, we find that mandatory IFRS 
adoption improves the precision of analysts' information sets in full sample firms and KOSPI firms. However, this 
does not hold for KOSDAQ firms. Finally, we find that the mandatory IFRS adoption reduces the degree of analyst 
coverage. In summary, mandatory IFRS adoption in Korea improves the information sets, especially for private 
information, promotes analysts to incorporate the improved information into their earnings forecasts, and increases 
the accuracy of forecasts especially for KOSPI firms. 
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